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ABSTRACT 
 
The pecking order theory of capital structure predicts that firms will finance a significant 
proportion of their financial deficit (investments + dividends – operating cash flows) with debt 
capital.  I also hypothesize that the amount of debt financing a firm actually uses is also related to 
its unused debt capacity.  The empirical analysis in this study confirms that firms follow the 
pecking order theory in financing their financial deficits.  Further, it is shown that firms with more 
unused debt capacity finance more of their financial deficits with debt than other firms.  
Specifically, the data indicates that firms with the most unused debt capacity finance 
approximately 50% of their financial deficits with debt while firms with less unused debt capacity 
finance approximately 25% of their financial deficits with debt.  The data also indicate that a 
failure to adjust for credit availability in an empirical analysis of financial deficit financing will 
significantly under estimate the degree to which firms follow the pecking order theory.  It is also 
confirmed that most firms seem to have a target capital structure but the actual firm debt ratio 
only reverts to the target at a rate of 5-10% per year.  Additionally, the data also shows that a 
combination of an investment grade credit rating and relatively low debt outstanding is a better 
proxy for credit availability than the more commonly used total assets. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n finance there are two main theories that seek to explain how businesses finance their investments: the 
pecking order theory and the tradeoff theory.  In the pecking order theory (see Myers (1984)), firms 
prefer to finance their investments (and dividends) with internally generated funds to avoid the under 
investment problem associated with risky debt and informational asymmetries between managers and the security 
markets.  If firms do not have sufficient internally generated funds to finance their investments they will issue debt 
to finance their financial deficit (investments + dividends – operating cash flows).  Only in extreme cases will they 
finance their investments with external equity capital.  As a consequence, firms following the pecking order theory 
do not have an optimal capital structure and their observed capital structure is just an artifact of their past investment 
opportunities and the availability of internally generated funds.  In the tradeoff theory firms choose their optimal 
capital structure by balancing the costs and benefits of additional debt financing (see Fama and French (2002)).  
These costs include the tax savings generated by the tax deductibility of interest, expected bankruptcy costs, and the 
agency costs of debt and equity.  Recent empirical tests of these theories have generally found some degree of 
support for both theories (see Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003) 
and Flannery and Rangan (2006)). 
 
 Both of these theories focus on the desired amount of debt firms wish to use in financing their investments 
and generally ignore the ability of firms to obtain their desired amount of debt financing.  The failure to account for 
the ability to borrow in empirical tests can lead to misleading results.  If firms follow the pecking order theory and 
credit availability is a determinant of how much debt financing a firm obtains, then firms with greater credit 
availability should finance a greater proportion of their financial deficit with debt.  If this is true, then in broad based 
empirical analyses where no account is taken of credit availability, the results will under estimate the extent to which 
firms follow the pecking order theory.  Consequently, the main focus of this study is to determine whether credit 
availability affects how much debt firms actually use in financing their financial deficits and how accurately the 
pecking order theory predicts how firms finance their financial deficits. 
 
 
 
I 
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DATA 
 
 The ability of a firm following the pecking order theory to use debt financing to finance its financial deficit 
may be limited by the amount of credit available to the firm, that is, its unused debt capacity.  A firms unused debt 
capacity is its debt capacity (the maximum amount of money creditors will lend) minus the amount of debt the firm 
has outstanding.  A firm’s outstanding debt is an observable variable but its debt capacity is not.  To proxy for debt 
capacity we use the firm’s credit rating.  Specifically, firms with an investment grade credit rating should be able to 
borrow more money than firms with a junk credit rating.  This results because some lenders, like banks and 
insurance companies, are prohibited by rule or law from investing in less than investment grade debt.  Still others, 
like investment grade bond funds, refuse by policy to invest in junk rated debt.  Combining the two components of 
unused debt capacity, firms with an investment grade credit rating and a long-term debt to assets ratio that is less 
than the 75th percentile for the sample firms (.355) are classified as firms with the greatest unused debt capacity. 
 
 The base sample of firms is all firms listed on the COMPUSTAT data base that have data for 2004.  To 
abstract from exchange listing effects, all firms not listed on the NYSE are excluded from the sample.  Additionally, 
all financial firms and utilities are eliminated from the sample.  This leaves a final sample of 1338 firms.  All data 
reported here comes from the COMPUSTAT data base and is for 2004 unless noted otherwise.  From the final 
sample of firms a subsample of firms with an investment grade credit rating and a long-term debt to total assets ratio 
at the end of 2003 (Debt/Assets (-1)) of less than the 75
th
 percentile of sample firms (.355) are classified a firms with 
the most unused debt capacity.  This subsample contains 260 firms.  
 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Selected Variables 
 
Panel A:  Firm Size 
 
      Full               Unused 
    Sample                Debt  Cap.    
 
Assets ($M)    8,228   4,026 
MVE ($M)    8,311   2,886 
 
Panel B:  Investments & Capital 
 
Investment/Assets    .166   .198 
Δ Debt/Assets    .029   .059 
Debt Issued/Assets    .024   .051 
Equity Issued/Assets   .007   .015 
Debt/Assets (-1)    .244   .231 
 
Panel C:  Profitability, R&D, etc. 
 
CF/Assets     .116   .102 
R&D/Assets     .019   .015 
PPE/Assets    .370   .363 
 
M = million 
 
 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the full sample of firms and the subsample of firms classified as 
having the most unused debt capacity.  The firms in the full sample have mean total assets (Assets) of $8,228 
million while the firms in the most unused debt capacity subsample have mean Assets of $4,026 million.  The 
market value of common equity (MVE) shows a somewhat larger size differential.  To adjust for this size 
differential all variables in Panels B and C are scaled by Assets.  As evidenced by the similar mean 
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Investment/Assets ratios ( .166 vs .198), the two groups of firms are making proportionately equivalent investments 
in new assets.  Investment is measured by the change in total assets from 2003 to 2004.  However, the subgroup of 
firms with the most unused credit capacity is using much more debt to finance their investments.  Looking at the 
change in long-term debt to total assets ratio (Δ Debt/Assets), the firms with the most unused debt capacity are, on 
average, financing with twice as much debt as the typical sample firm (.029 versus .059).  If debt financing is 
measured by the net long-term debt issued to total assets ratio (Debt Issued/Assets), similar results are obtained.  
Firms with the most unused debt capacity have a mean Debt Issued/Assets ratio of .051 versus .024 for the full 
sample of firms.  These results indicate that the amount of unused debt capacity a firm has effects how closely its 
financial deficit financing follows the pecking order theory.  There does not seem to be any major differences 
between the two groups of sample firms in regards to profitability (operating cash flow to total assets (CF/Assets)), 
research and development expenditures (R&D/Assets) or net property, plant, and equipment (PPE/Assets). 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 Next, a regression analysis is used to test for the relationship between unused credit capacity and the 
amount of debt financing used to fund the firm’s financial deficit.  In the first series of regressions, the dependent 
variable is Debt Issued/Assets and the primary explanatory variable is the firm’s financial deficit (Fin Def).  The 
financial deficit is the sum of investments (change in total assets) and cash dividends paid less operating cash flow 
(income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization).  The pecking order theory predicts that the 
coefficient of this variable should be positive.  A second explanatory variable employed is an interactive variable 
calculated as the dummy variable Unu Debt Cap multiplied by Fin Def.  Unu Debt Cap takes on a value of one if a 
firm is in the subsample of firms with the most unused debt capacity (described above) and zero otherwise.  If firms 
with more unused debt capacity finance a larger part of their financial deficit with debt than other firms then the 
coefficient of the interactive variable should be positive.  Debt/Assets (-1) will also be used as an explanatory 
variable.  If the tradeoff theory is correct a firm’s debt to asset ratio should be mean reverting and the sign of this 
variable should be negative.  See Fama and French (2002) for a more detailed discussion of this point.  The natural 
log of total assets in 2003 (ln Assets (-1)) is also included in some of the regressions to account for any size effects 
on firm capital structure.  Many studies have found a direct relationship between firm size and the amount of debt in 
the firm’s capital structure.  This is conventionally interpreted to mean that larger firms have better access to the 
credit markets and can raise more debt capital than smaller firms.  Therefore, ln Assets (-1) is measuring essentially 
the same thing as the Unu Debt Cap dummy variable.  The regression analysis should indicate which is the better 
measure of access to debt financing.  Five other control variables will also be employed to account for other factors 
that have been found to affect the amount of debt a firm has in its capital structure.  These factors include 
profitability, variability of firm cash flows, net property, plant and equipment, research and development 
expenditures, and depreciation and amortization expense.  All of these variables are scaled by total assets.   The 
values of these variables are lagged one year to eliminate any endogeny problems.  Since these variables are not of 
primary interest in this study a further discussion of them is omitted.   
 
 The results of the regressions employing net debt issued divided by total assets as the dependent variable 
are presented in Table 2.  In the first regression the coefficient of Fin Def is .233 and significant at the 1% level (z 
value = 24.0)l.  This implies that, on average, the sample firms are financing 23.3% of their financial deficits with 
debt.  This supports Frank and Goyal’s (2003) finding that since the 1990s firms have been using much less debt to 
finance their financial deficits than they were previously (up to 75%).  In the second regression, the interactive 
variable is included as an explanatory variable.  The coefficient of Fin Def is positive (.190) and significant at the 
1% level.  The value of this coefficient implies that firms with moderate levels of unused debt capacity finance 19% 
of their financial deficits with debt.  The coefficient of the interactive variable is also positive (.157) and significant 
at the 1% level.  This confirms the central thesis of this study that firms with the most unused debt capacity finance 
more of their financial deficits with debt than other firms.  Specifically, firms with the most unused credit capacity 
finance 34.7% (19.0 + 15.7) of their financial deficits with debt, which is 15.7% more than firms with less unused 
debt capacity.  Comparing this result to the coefficient of Fin Def in the first regression (.233 or 23.3%) indicates 
that failing to adjust for credit availability will result in an under estimate of the extent to which firms follow the 
pecking order theory.  In the third regression, the lagged debt ratio (Debt/Assets (-1)) is added as an explanatory 
variable.  The coefficient of this variable is negative (-.056) and significant at the 1% level.  The sign and scale of 
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this coefficient indicate that the debt ratio is mean reverting toward a target debt ratio but at a very slow rate, 5.6% 
per year.  This result is consistent with the tradeoff theory of firm capital structure.  The coefficients of the financial 
deficit and interactive variables are little affected by including this extra explanatory variable.   
 
 
Table 2 
Regression Analysis of Net Debt Issued 
 
Dependent Variable:  Net Debt Issued / Assets 
 
Intercept   .008b  .007a   .020c   -.001 
   (z value)  (2.00) (1.89) (3.52) (-0.20) 
 
Fin Def   .233c .190c  .194c  .252c 
 (24.0) (17.2)  (18.1)  (18.8) 
 
Unu Debt Cap ∙ Fin Def - .157c  .151c   .223c   
 (7.52)  (7.47) (10.2)  
 
Debt/Assets (-1) - - -.056c  -.026a  
 (-3.09)  (-1.69)  
 
ln Assets (-1) - -  - -.002 
   (-0.90) 
 
Control Var.  No No No  Yes 
 
Adj. R2  .32 .35  .38   .51  
F value 577c 330c 241c   123c  
N 1200 1200 1170  1051 
 
a = significant at the 10% level 
b = significant at the 5% level 
c = significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 In the last regression, ln Assets (-1) and the five control variables are added to the regressions.  To conserve 
space the coefficients of the five control variables are not reported.  Adding these additional variables increases the 
Adj. R
2
 form .38 to .51 and increases the magnitudes of the coefficients of Fin Def and the interactive variable.  
These new coefficients imply that firms with the most unused debt capacity finance 47.5% of their financial deficits 
with debt while other firms only finance 25.2% of their financial deficits with debt.  Also, the coefficient on ln 
Assets (-1) is insignificant, indicating that the unused debt capacity proxy used in this study is a better proxy for debt 
financing capability than firm size (ln Assets (-1)).  The coefficient of the lagged debt ratio remains negative and 
significant but is smaller in magnitude than in the previous regression. 
 
 In the second set of regressions, an alternate measure of debt financing (the change in long-term debt 
divided by total assets) is used as the dependent variable.  The results of these regressions are contained in Table 3.  
As in the previous regressions, the coefficients of Fin Def are all positive and significant at the 1% level.  The 
coefficients of the interactive variable are also all positive and significant at the 1% level.  Additionally, the 
coefficients of both variables are significantly larger than the corresponding coefficients in the previous regressions.  
Using the coefficients from the fourth regression implies that firms with the most unused debt capacity finance 
55.2% of their financial deficits with new debt while firms with less unused debt capacity finance 25.9% of their 
financial deficit with debt capital.  The coefficients of Debt/Assets (-1) also remain negative and statistically 
significant and are somewhat larger than in the previous regressions.  This confirms that the sample firms debt ratios 
exhibit mean reversion toward a target capital structure.  The coefficient of ln Assets (-1) remains insignificant. 
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Table 3 
Regression Analysis of the Change in Long-Term Debt 
 
Dependent Variable:  Change in LT Debt/Assets 
 
Intercept  .008b .008b   .032c   .005  
   (z value)  (2.16) (2.04)  (5.61)   (0.32)  
 
Fin Def   .303c  .254c  .254c   .259c  
 (31.9)  (24.1)   (24.4)   (22.1)  
  
Hi Debt Cap ∙ Fin Def -  .196c  .193c  .293c  
 (9.40)  (9.40)   (13.7)  
 
Debt/Assets (-1) - - -.103c  -.090c    
 (-5.56)  (-5.73)  
 
ln Assets (-1) - - -  -.001 
  (-0.17)  
 
Control Var.  No No No  Yes 
 
Adj. R2 .45     .48  .50  .56  
F value 1020c 590c  413c   162c   
N 1254   1254  1254  1129 
 
a = significant at the 10% level 
b = significant at the 5% level 
c = significant at the 1% level 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The pecking order theory of capital structure predicts that firms will finance a significant proportion of 
their financial deficit (investments + dividends – operating cash flows) with debt capital.  I also hypothesize that the 
amount of debt financing a firm actually uses is also related to its unused debt capacity.  The empirical analysis in 
this study confirms that firms follow the pecking order theory in financing their financial deficits.  Further, it is 
shown that firms with more unused debt capacity finance more of their financial deficits with debt than other firms.  
Specifically, the data indicates that firms with the most unused debt capacity finance approximately 50% of their 
financial deficits with debt while firms with less unused debt capacity finance approximately 25% of their financial 
deficits with debt.  The data also indicate that a failure to adjust for credit availability in an empirical analysis of 
financial deficit financing will significantly under estimate the degree to which firms follow the pecking order 
theory.  It is also confirmed that most firms seem to have a target capital structure but the actual firm debt ratio only 
reverts to the target at a rate of 5-10% per year.  Additionally, the data also shows that a combination of an 
investment grade credit rating and relatively low debt outstanding is a better proxy for credit availability than the 
more commonly used total assets. 
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